This article presents a new measure for cross-cultural studies of family driven age-and gender related inequalities. This composite measure, which the authors call the Patriarchy Index, combines a range of variables related to familial behaviour, such as patterns of marriage and post-marital residence, living arrangements, the position of the aged and seniority patterns within domestic groups, and the sex of the offspring, thus representing the varying degrees of sex-and age-related social inequality in different familial settings. The comparative advantages of the index are tested by assessing how 266 historical European regional populations from the Atlantic to Moscow scored on the patriarchy scale. Further importance of the index is tested against contemporary measures of gender discrimination showing strong correlation between historical and contemporary inequality patterns. Finally, we test for the associations between demographic, institutional, socioeconomic and environmental characteristics of the regional populations and the spatial variation in the patriarchy levels. Overall, the study furthers two research fields: the one increasingly stressing the importance of the family as a crucial generator of societal inequalities; and the other arguing for the importance of the historical context when analyzing current global inequality patterns.
Introduction
Inequality is one of the most discussed problems in contemporary social sciences, as well as in national and global politics (Milanović, 2010) . Last decade, in particular, had witnessed enormous developments in this regard, as more and more data were collected on a (nearly) global scale and subjected to ever increasingly sophisticated analyses striving to find out and show what 'inequality' looks like, what its tendencies are, as well as its consequences (Milanović, 2005; Therborn, 2006) . Economists in particular have devoted more energy than others to global studies of the contemporary distributional dynamics. Economic historians, including those subsumed under the New Institutional Economic History label -have recently joined the bandwagon providing sterling contributions to our understanding of historical  Max Planck for Social Anthropology, Halle/Saale. Corresponding author (szoltysek@eth.mpg.de) ++ University of Graz, Austria. ^^University of Białystok, Poland. national and global inequalities in the distribution of wealth, income, and well-being (Van Zanden et al., 2014a , 2014b Milanović et al., 2011) .
Ever since, inequalities by gender played a crucial role in those discussions. Apart from being stimulated by intrinsic, social justice perspective, and the variable nature of gender across cultures (Schlegel 1989) 2 , recently this interest in gender equality was fuelled by recognition of the economic literature that women are important for a wide range of development outcomes (World Bank, 2011; earlier Boserup, 1970) . While the now general strive for gender equality across the world is scientifically well informed, it's success or failure depends on the efficiency of measuring sex-related inequalities across societies. Over the last three decades, measures capturing different aspects of gender inequalities in outcomes, as well as those focusing on the institutions underlying those disparities, have become available (for a review see Johnston 1985; Young et al. 1994; Malhotra et al., 2002; Klassen, 2006; also Carmichael, 2014, 100-104; Whyte, 1978b) . The field continues to evolve (Dilli et al., 2014) .
For all the contributions already there on the field of gender inequality, they are impacted by at least two main drawbacks. First, there has been a striking absence of long-term perspective in much of gender inequality studies. None of the composite gender indices used in the developmental literature pre-date 1995, and recent attempts to provide greater historical depth via the Historical Gender Equality Index (HGEI) though undeniably further the current measurement spectrum, are only a moderate step forward from the long run perspective (the gender measures they employ go back only to the 1950s; see Carmichael et al., 2014; Dilli et al., 2014) . As one move further back in time the available data and indicators tend to narrow quite dramatically, and for a more distant past they are largely unavailable for larger social groups or geographical clusters of population (Drwenski, 2015; also Milanović et al., 2011) .
This presents a potentially serious drawback because gender inequality may have had historical roots (Lynch, 2011) , and women's pathway to equal rights and socioeconomic standing has been generally a long-term process to be observed in the long run (Dorius and Firebaugh, 2010) .
2 Two early anthropological works provided striking evidence on multidimensionality of female 'status'. . In the late 1960s Schlegel performed a cross-cultural study of female domestic status in matrilineal societies. She found a striking variability of male-female dominance patterns in 66 societies studied, which she grouped into 'three styles of domestic authority' (Schlegel, 1972; also Schlegel, 1975) . In 1978 Martin Whyte published the first hologeistic study on the general status of women in 93 preindustrial societies. Though he discerned only very few correlations between 52 variables measuring the relative status of women in his cross-cultural survey (see Whyte, 1978a, ch. 5, p. 96-106) , some important elements of female status (domestic authority and public status) were found to correlate negatively with societal and cultural complexity (i.e. in the complex societies of Eurasia with plow agriculture).
Secondly, while various theorists stressed the multidimensionality of gender inequalities (e.g. Whyte, 1978a; Schlegel, 1972; Mason, 1986; Young et al., 1994) , most of the analyses tend to investigate gender discrimination in separate from other associated forms of discrimination. Meanwhile, it has been suggested that that gender inequality is inextricably braided with other systems of inequality (Coltrane and Adams, 2000, p. x; cf. also Young et al., 1994, 61) , of which the discrimination by age (seniority) -i.e. the institutionalized superiority of the older over the younger -is the most crucial one. According to Therborn (2004, p. 13-14) , together with age-discrimination, gender inequality forms two 'basic intrinsic dimensions' of patriarchy. These two forms of expropriation are dialectically related and often act to reinforce each other in fostering complex hierarchy of authority patterns based on both age and gender (see Joseph, 1996; Zuo, 2009; Dyson and Moore, 1983; also Halpern et al., 1996) . This paper is intended to enrich the ongoing discussion by: 1) suggesting a new inequality measure -the Patriarchy Index (later PI) -that incorporates gender along with its related discrimination dimensions (i.e. seniority) in a place and time sensitive way, going as far back as to the late 17 th century (see Gruber and Szołtysek, 2015) ; 2) using this new measure to unravel what regional patterns and trends over time we can see in the European past, and what are their main determinants; 3) testing the relevance of the new measure against other more established tools from gender inequality research.
This paper is organized as follows. We first present the datasets that have been used.
Then we elucidate our notion of patriarchy and its components, and present a list of variables for measuring these elements. Next, we introduce the Patriarchy Index, and discuss its strengths and caveats in the context of inequality research. This will set the scene for a review of the Index' application across 266 regions of historic Europe. In two subsequent sections we will test the relevance of the new measure against other more established tools from gender inequality research, and will use ordinary least squares regression to control for the effects of variation in institutional and socioeconomic conditions on the patriarchy levels across the samples. We discuss the implications of our study for broader comparative research on historical inequalities at the end of the paper.
Data
Because historical measures of inequality are rare and difficult to develop, the success of any attempt at revealing the issue at -preferably -pan-European -scale, is contingent upon the availability of relevant data (Johnston, 1985, p. 234) . In our efforts to construct a composite historical measure of age and sex discrimination we relied on census and census-like microdata from Mosaic and North Atlantic Population Projects (NAPP), because these data are abundant across historic Europe, they are publicly available in the form of machinereadable, harmonized microdata samples, and they are relatively easy to process Szołtysek, 2015a; Ruggles et al., 2011) (Table 1 ; Figure 1 below shows the distribution of those regions across space) 3 .
The Mosaic Project et.al., 2011) were applied, focusing on the oldest available data for these Northwest European countries 4 . The Mosaic and NAPP microdata samples are very similar in terms of structure, organization and available information. In each case, they describe the characteristics of the individuals in a settlement or area grouped into households (co-resident domestic groups), providing the interrelationships between co-resident persons. All demographic variables stored in the databases are harmonized across space and time using common international standards, allowing spatially sensitive accounts of historical localized gender and generational indicators to be generated across multiple locations (Gruber and Szołtysek, 2015; . Since Mosaic/NAPP census and census-like microdata are hierarchical and multilevel, individual-and household-level observations they provide can be aggregated and taken as evidence for larger-scale "structures," including villages, parishes, administrative regions, and states, as well as other geographically bounded terrains.
Our units of analysis are "regions", i.e. geographically defined groups of people.
These regions are administrative units used in the respective census (all NAPP data and most of Mosaic data) or created for the purpose of this analysis (in the absence of applicable administrative units). Overall there are 266 such regions (see Table 1 ). These regions have been grouped into seven larger European territorial clusters meant to capture the varying 3 www.censusmosaic.org; https://www.nappdata.org/napp/. 4 In order to minimize a possible modernization effect of the 19 th century on patriarchal patterns, we decided to use the oldest available NAPP data for Northwestern Europe. This was possible for Iceland, Denmark, and Norway, but unfortunately no data earlier than 1880/81 census is available for Great Britain and Sweden within the NAPP collection (the data for Great Britain in 1851 is highly clustered and therefore not used). We have used the 100-percent-samples with the exception of England, where a 10-percent-sample is used. Though Mosaic data are based on various sampling schemes (these, in turn, contingent upon the varying data availability), they cannot be considered a probability sample of all historical European societies or cultures.
institutional and socioeconomic characteristics at the time of the census. NAPP data is grouped into Scandinavia and Great Britain, while Mosaic data is grouped into "Germany" (to cover German-speaking areas outside of Habsburg territories), "West" (west and southwest of Germany), "Habsburg", "East" (the area of East-Central and Eastern Europe, i.e. the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, as well as Russia), and Balkans (south of Croatia and Hungary). There are certain theoretical merits of identifying the systematic forms of gender and generational biases at the familial or household level. There is a general appreciation of the fact that the household (family) is a particularly meaningful site for measuring gender equity and discrimination (e.g. Folbre, 1986; Lamphere ,1975; Ilcan, 1996; Malhotra et. al., 2002; also Narayan, 2006) . While households have been a ubiquitous and essential part of the 5 Mosaic data generally has regions which are either urban or rural, while NAPP data is analysed according to administrative boundaries of the time of the census. Therefore regions of NAPP data are of mixed urban and rural populations. The definition of urban is not the same for all NAPP data, but we use the information provided in the microdata. The censuses of Iceland in 1703 and of Norway in 1801 do not provide such information and therefore we have assumed that these regions were predominantly rural.
functioning of an preindustrial economy and a society (Szołtysek, 2015a) , they were also the most basic arena for kinship, socialization and the transmission of values, including those related to power and equality, justice and gender relations, age hierarchy and stratification (Kok, forthcoming) , as well as the relationship between the individual and the authority (Dilli, 2016) . That differently configured family systems are capable of shaping demographic processes -including generational relations and family welfare, in distinct ways, has been long know to demographers (e.g. Skinner, 1997) . Recently, the New Institutional Economists showed that the family and household organization patterns exert considerable influence on regional inequalities through their divergent impact on the status of women, investments in human capital, persistence of specific cultural norms and values, labor relations, and development of corporative institutions (e.g. Alesina and Giuliano, 2014; Carmichael et al., 2016) .
Patriarchy and its composite measure
Contrary to often value-laden, monolithic, and ideologically determined discourse of patriarchy in Western feminism (see Walby, 1990) , we treat the concept as a useful descriptive tool for discussing broader social inequality patterns in a comparative perspective.
In line with a number of recent theorists, we see patriarchy not as having a single form or site, but as encompassing a much wider realm (cf. Kandiyoti, 1988; Joseph, 1996) . According to Therborn, patriarchy has two basic intrinsic dimensions: "the rule of the father and the rule of the husband, in that order" (2004, p. 13-14) . As such, it refers to generational and to conjugal family relations, or, more clearly, to generational and gender relations, thus encompassing both the stratification by sex in social attainment, as well as the domination of men over each other based on the seniority principle (Joseph, 1996) . Finally, Halpern showed that the multifaceted nature of the Balkan patriarchy has been historically anchored in the interlocking combination of the rule of the father, the eldest, or the husband (Halpern et al., 1996) 6 .
Based on these considerations, but mitigated by the very nature of the data available to us (see above), we conceptualized "patriarchal" elements as clustering in the four "domains" which we believe capture the four major dimensions of the phenomenon under consideration:
domination of men over women, domination of the older generation over the younger generation, the extent of patrilocality, and the preference for sons. Table 2 provides the list of the components considered, showing how they were actually defined and measured, and 6 To the best of our knowledge, Malhotra's et al., 1995 remains the only formal specification of 'patriarchy'. However, the authors focus solely on the latter's gender aspect.
indicating the expected direction of their relationship with societal patriarchy levels (+/-) (for a comprehensive discussion of all components and age standardization, see Gruber and Szołtysek, 2015) . Table 3 presents a summary of the descriptive statistics for all of these variables considered for the computation of the index. Table 2 somewhere here   Table 3 somewhere here
For the main empirical analysis, these variables were combined in one composite measure, the Patriarchy Index, which gives equal weight to the domains listed in Table 2 , thus representing the varying degrees of sex-and age-related social inequality ('patriarchal bias') in different societal and familial settings. Since the strategy for the construction of the Index was described in detail elsewhere (Gruber and Szołtysek, 2015) , here we only stress that both the component variables within specific domains, as well as the domains themselves were generally correlated with each other in the expected direction 7 . While the inter-domanial correlations are usually not particularly high (with some notable exceptions), most of them can be considered moderate to strong depending on the choice of boundaries (all of them are also positively correlated at a significant level). This applies also to the relationship between gender and generational domination, which we argued should be inextricably braided with each other (Figure 2 ). Overall, these interrelationships are generally reassuring in both validating the usage of the index as one measurement of patriarchy 8 , and in justifying our plea for exploring gender and seniority biases conjointly.
Such constructed, our Index can be used to measure comparatively the "intensity" of patriarchy across time and space; thus approximating "systems of sex-and age-related social inequality", in which individuals have differing levels of access to power, capabilities, prestige, and autonomy depending on gender and age (cf. Niraula and Morgan, 1996) .
Accordingly, in Table 4 we provide a general benchmark against which all of regions included in the analysis can be grouped into five clusters of different levels of intensity of patriarchy.
7 For example, out of 45 correlations between the different components (see Table 3 ), 31, i.e. 69 percent, were significant. 8 Cf. Whyte (1978a) who compared 52 variables measuring the relative status of women in a cross-cultural survey of 93 preindustrial societies (the variables included, e.g., arranged marriages, inheritance, marriage payments, female control over property, etc.), to find only very few correlations between them (hardly ever above 0.3, most of them insignificant; see Whyte, 1978a, ch. 5, p. 96-106. Figure 2 somewhere here Table 4 somewhere here
Spatial distribution of the Patriarchy Index
The distribution of the Index across space is presented in two ways. Figure 3 shows the complete scale of index points arranged according to regional membership and time period,
while Figure 4 charts the data geographically. The observed values of the PI range from eight to 35 points. There were no regions with absolutely any patriarchal features as defined above, same as no societies to which absolute patriarchal characteristics could be assigned. Although it would be an exaggeration to speak of clear-cut groupings of regions with high or low patriarchy intensities across historic Europe, certain patterns do emerge. At the most general level, the ranking of regions is broadly consistent with perceptions from the historical demographic and sociological literature, and seems to confirm the dichotomous East-West pattern (Hajnal, 1982; Therborn, 2004) . Western Europe tended to be much less patriarchal than eastern and southeastern Europe. Patriarchal features were much more pronounced than elsewhere on the continent as we move east and south of the Danube after it passes Vienna; and especially east of the Bug River, where Polish and Ukrainian ethnicities converge; and then farther into the territories of European Russia.
This generalization is, however, subject to certain qualifications. While indeed, the areas around the North Sea Basin had generally lower levels of patriarchy than elsewhere, the lowest patriarchy intensities have been found also in Germany and Scandinavia. Especially in the cities, the levels of patriarchy in northern Germany, which is adjacent to Scandinavia, appear to have been low. Equally striking was that low patriarchy was not confined to any particular region of Europe, but rather to a vast area stretching from Iceland and Great Britain, through northern France, the Low Countries, Germany, and Scandinavia, and extending even We also observe a considerable variation within countries and across the macroregions of Europe, including those defined in the paper. The territory between the Baltic, the Adriatic, and the Black Seas seems to have been particularly diverse, as it might include places with low levels of patriarchy ( like the western and northern parts of historical Poland), or places with moderate to even high levels of patriarchy (such as the many locations across Hungary, Slovakia, and Romania). In fact, historical Poland-Lithuania (once encompassing Poland, Lithuania, Belarus and much of the Ukraine) is the only historical region for which we found a combination of high-to-low patriarchy intensities. These features of the country's "patriarchal profile" strengthen assertions made elsewhere that, relative to the family organization patterns across Europe, the patterns found in Poland-Lithuania were of a transitory, intermediate nature (Szołtysek, 2015b) . In addition, Germany with the combination of very low, low, and medium degrees of patriarchy, was also found to have been very diverse.
Furthermore, the observed distributions of patriarchy do not necessarily comply with corresponding patterning of three main types of family systems (neolocal nuclear; patrilocalstem; patrilocal-joint) commonly attributed to the European past. While it has been argued that gender structural bias generally informs the three main types of family systems in contingent fashion, being most pronounced in joint family systems and minimal in conjugal family systems, with stem family systems as intermediate (Skinner, 1997, p. 58-60) , we find the family-patriarchy relationship to be more complex. For example, regions with prevailing conjugal-neolocal model of family (like northern France and Romania) may still be distinguished by their low versus medium patriarchy; Norwegian and Westphalian stemfamilies would also score differently on the patriarchal scale, and the same applies to the comparison between East-central European joint-family regions in Latvia, central Ukraine and Slovakia .
Finally, our data do not support a usual "vernacular" story purporting that 'once upon a time there was a traditional stark patriarchy in Europe' which tended to diminish once societies or regional populations have started to develop and 'modernize'. While caution is required when approaching pooled cross-sections included in Figure 3 , these data suggest that societies and regional populations alike were not fully commensurable and did not move along the one line of progress as regards their patriarchal traits. While it might be argued that one of the reasons for the relatively low levels of patriarchy in much of Great Britain might be attributed to the late time period of its data, data from other regions do not support this general tenet. The earliest data from Scandinavia had either equally low patriarchy levels, or even lower as those from the late nineteenth-century; early 19 th century data from Germany were scoring not much worse on the patriarchal scale than those from the end of the century;
and Eastern localities, though underrepresented in later periods, do not show any clear signs of moderation in their patriarchy levels with the passage of time. Finally, early twentiethcentury Albania was strikingly more patriarchal than several populations of the Balkan area from hundred or more years earlier.
The Patriarchy Index and other gender inequality measures
Before endorsing the comparative advantages of the index based on Mosaic and NAPP data, four potential caveats (or misconceptions) regarding its relevance for wider historical inequality studies need to be addressed.
First, like all quantitative, indexed measures of inequality, our own European approach to patriarchy is subject to the criticism of failing to capture the true complexity of the concepts it purports to measure. However, a fundamental issue in the use of historical statistics has always been the problematic relationship between what one wants to measure theoretically and the data series available for construction of empirical indicators. While the Index inevitably implies a reduction of 'patriarchy's' internal intricacies to a set of quantifiable characteristics, this is the only way to go if spatially sensitive descriptions of historical gender and generational indicators are to be generated on the large scale. While many existing indices are based on available pre-aggregated information, the advantage of the index based on census microdata lies in the possibility for creating new variables, thus covering new dimensions of inequality.
Still, if "sex-and age-related social inequality" is to be defined as the departure from parity in the representation of women and men and/or young and old in key dimensions of social life such as health, politics, economics, labor, and family (see; Young et al., 1994, p. 57, 59) 10 , then the PI covers explicitly only the latter of them, which puts certain limits on its exploratory power. While the Index' good anchorage in the familial /domestic sphere that was considered crucial for the production of systematic forms of gender and generational biases is clearly advantageous, our results should be confronted with patriarchy research based on other sources and covering other spheres, providing such a research would ever become compiled on a larger scale.
Thirdly, it has to be remembered, that unlike most existing social science indicators of sex discrimination, the PI does not solely indicate gender differences (or women's status), but merges the gender dimension with that of the seniority. While this offers a more encompassing approach to multidimensionality of empowerment and agency (especially in the light of the predicted pairing of the two dimensions; see Narayan, 2006, p. 74-75) , it may also present a comparative disadvantage because of difficulties involved in comparing the Index with other -primarily gender laden -measures.
Finally, it needs to be recognized that because the Index marks the situation of women, the aged and the young in terms of their attainment of some socially valued resources (or positions) without measuring the position of these groups to some normative standards or reference categories, it represents the absolute, not relative measure of gender-and ageinequality (see Johnston, 1985, esp. 233 ff; Young et al., 1994, p. 57-58) 11 . This property of our measure must be kept in mind while attempting comparisons with exact indicators of inequalities, be it gender or age-related.
Give these ambiguities, it might be interesting to check to what extent our regional patriarchy estimates overlap with some more comprehensively derived accounts of gender and/or age related inequalities at a large scale. To this end, we find it particularly useful to test the association of the Index with a composite measure developed by Carmichael which provides a general picture of how the interplay between the various features of the family system as they relate to the position of women looks on selected European spots.
Carmichael's measure, known as 'Girl Friendliness Index' (GFI), gives a sense of how gender friendly each society was based on the various components of its family system, these being inheritance patterns, domestic organization, the prevalence of cousin marriage, post-marital residence and the extent of monogamy (Carmichael, 2014, p. 187-189) . While some of these measures correspond at least vaguely to our own components of the IP, they were derived in a different manner by utilizing ethnographic information from both Murdock and Todd, which was then averaged at the country level 12 .
A quick check of Carmichael's results against our own, averaged at the country level, can be visually judged by means of two scatterplots below. Because our own results are only available for a limited number of European countries, so the scatterplot above has to be approached with caution. The exact methodology for matching these two sources is explained in Rijpma and Carmichael (2016) , and Bolt (2012). Todd's data is most detailed for Europe, while it is the least detailed in Murdock's data. While only a quarter of Murdock's data covers the pre-1890 period, Todd claims his data captures pre-industrial conditions (Todd, 1985) . 13 According to Carmichael, Spain has been equally 'girl friendly' as Great Britain, whereas they differ substantially in their patriarchy levels; Iceland and Albania, i.e. countries almost at the extremes of patriarchal scales, are considered equal according to GFI. 14 Here, we are exclusively interested in a diagnostic dimension of the relationship, without positing any explicit causal links between past and present. If the varying historical patriarchy levels influenced contemporary gender inequalities in any detectable way, they did so in a path-dependent manner, a proper testing of which would have to face a problem of reverse causality and time-varying covariates. 15 This measure aims to capture gaps between the genders rather than absolute levels of achievement, and in particular seeks to capture those results which stem from the unequal treatment of women. The HGEI captures gender differences in life expectancy, labour force participation, infant mortality, educational attainment, marriage ages, and political participation. We have decided to use HGEI data from decade 2000, since they are the most complete ones. We thank S. Carmichael and A. Rijpma for sharing their data with us.
Again, there is a substantial negative relationship between the two measures, with countries which score high on the historical patriarchy scale also scaling low in the present day gender equality. Even without positing explicit claims as to lasting impact of historical patterns of the age and sex-biases on gender equalities/inequalities today, the observed association between the two measures is an important finding pointing out a potential relevance of the Index for contemporary social sciences.
Predicting patriarchy
Why do some societies reveal higher levels of patriarchy, and others lower? Answering this question presents a formidable task, especially given an inherent difficulty in acquiring comprehensive information on potential predictors from the surviving body of historical statistics 16 . What follows, then, presents anything but just a provisional picture circumscribed but a variety of caveats, and subject to change.
Our analytical strategy is straightforward. The unit of analysis were the 266 regional populations for which the Patriarchy Index (our dependent variable), along with a set of covariates which strive to capture the broad variation in historical human capital levels and living standards, as well in agriculture and institutional framework, have been computed 17 .
To control for the variation in historical human capital levels, for each of the regional populations we computed numeracy expressed by a tendency to round self-reported ages in the census. The Spoorenberg's Index (W tot ) was used instead of other measures of age heaping (such as Whipple's or ABCC indexes) in order to account for all types of digit preference in our data, not only those related to rounding on 0 or 5 (Spoorenberg, 2007) . A rich economic history literature has shown numeracy to be a good proxy for basic education (incl. the spread of literacy), especially in preindustrial times, and thus a meaningful indicator 16 Referring to medieval England, Bennett (2007, 78) suggested that "patriarchy was an effect of many institutions", but has not specified their potential effects any further. Therborn, speaking of 'depatriarchalization' referred to historical legislation changes, proletarianization, and wider processes of urbanization and industrialization as possible primary causal factors (2004, 17-22; similarly Moghadam, 1992; Mann 1986 ). According to Rahman and Rao (2004) , key determinants of female inequity were cultural norms (esp. regarding kinship), economic conditions, and state policies and legislation. Alesina is currently the best known proponent of the view according to which traditional agricultural practices influenced the historical gender division of labor and the evolution of gender norms (Alesina et al., 2013) , though the origins of this hypothesis go back to Boserup (1970) . 17 The rules of descent (Murdock, 1949, p. 15, 43-46; Goody 1961; Levinson ad Malone 1980, 99-112 ), yet another potential determinant of patriarchy, has not been considered here because some of the IP components seem to be strongly related (if not epiphenomenal) to prevailing descent rules (DESCENT was strongly and positively correlated with patriarchy in all regression models we have tried). Another reason to not include this variable was the sharp multicollinearity between DESCENT and some regional dummies (see below).
for human capital (Baten and Tollnek, 2016) . Since W tot measures the extent of 'antinumeracy', we expect a positive relationship between this variable and patriarchy.
We used the child-woman ratio (the ratio of living children under the age of five to the number of women between the ages 15 and 49, multiplied by 1000; see Willingan and Lynch, 1982, 102-104) and the proportion of the elderly (65+) in each regional population as the crude approximations of living standards (Rosset 1964, 209-210, 231 ) and the quality of surveying institutions. We assumed their negative relationship with the dependent variable 18 .
To control for potentially 'de-patriarchalizing' factors associated with urban industrial life, the proportion of rural population was computed for each region. Finally, regions were distinguished based on whether their populations were subjected serfdom or not, assuming three possible channels through which the latter could increase the patriarchal bias among our regions. First, serfdom was thought to have encouraged the formation of complex family structures (which, overall, tended to be more patriarchal than more streamlined family types) (Alderson and Sanderson 1991) . Furthermore, given the needs of upholding rigid social control among the subject peasantry, serfdom (especially in its Russian version) provided conditions under which the authority of the household patriarchs (usually the eldest males) was institutionally endowed by the seigniors (Hoch 1986 ). Finally, because of its heavy reliance on coerced labor with draught animals (corvee), serfdom created structural conditions acute to devaluation of the female labor, thus having potentially negative impact on women's status and agency (Szołtysek, 2015b, vol. 1., p. 484; Alesina et al., 2013) .
Since variables not considered may still exist and could affect the dependent variable directly or even affect both dependent and independent variables, we added regional dummies to control for the effect of omitted regional characteristics such as efficiency of bureaucracy, the role of labor markets, legal systems, etc. The regional dummies (REGIONS) are Germany, West, Britain, Scandinavia, East, Habsburg lands and the Balkans. Finally, our regional populations were classified according to the date of census taking, i.e. as 'pre-1800' (a reference category), '1800-1850', and 'after 1850'. Based on the general wisdom of sociological and historical literature (Therborn, 2004) , we expect patriarchy levels to decrease in time.
Due to limitations in the available variables, the regression models should not be interpreted as attempts to establish causality. Our usage of the OLS regression is bound to control for the effects of a broad variation in institutional and socioeconomic framework, and not to assess the statistical significance of each independent variable. The primary purpose of the regression is to evaluate the level of patriarchy in each census sample and to assess systematically whether the patriarchy level in each region is high or low, given the institutional and socioeconomic circumstances accounted for. Furthermore, we use the regression to predict patriarchy across Mosaic and NAPP data. These predicted levels can then be compared with the actual strength of patriarchy in each region, allowing to gauge whether a given population has higher or lower patriarchal bias than would be expected on the basis of that population's institutional and socioeconomic characteristics. Table 5 shows the results of OLS regressions of the PI by region on the variables discussed above. Altogether, three ordinary least-squares (OLS) models were run, each time using weights for seven broad regional clusters of the data (REGIONS). The first model In the graph, most regions cluster rather closely around the diagonal line, underscoring the finding that a few simple institutional and socioeconomic indicators effectively predict a large share of variation in the patriarchy levels. Generally, no particular regional outliers can be discerned, and the regions' constituent populations spread rather equally on both sides of the diagonal. Though Mosaic populations display relatively larger variation (they tend to fall below and above the diagonal more significantly than the NAPP data), they do so symmetrically. This is understandable given a generally greater dispersion of Mosaic data across time and space.
Conclusions
This study sought to move the analysis of historical gender inequalities beyond its usual confines of a one-dimensional focus on sex-stratification/discrimination. It suggested a historical inequality measure that combines both patria potestas and manus mariti, i.e. both fatherly and husbandly power, along with other dimensions in a composite manner. First, it demonstrates that using historical data with limited but massively available information, it is possible to construct variables which provide for measuring gender and generational relations in the past on a European scale. Secondly, by providing localised indicators combining both gender and age relations, the Index allowed to better account for the historical cross-cutting of gender bias with other forms of discrimination. This, we believe, enhances both the historical reconstruction of different dynamics of power in preindustrial Europe, as well as the current body of historical statistics on cross-societal inequalities.
Applying the new composite indexed measure to census microdata provided the first account of the regional prevalence of gender-and age-based authority patterns across regional populations of historic Europe. It showed that the complex societies of (western) Eurasia (Goody, 1976) , have themselves differed significantly in terms of authority and status accrued to females, as well as in their seniority patterns. The spatial contours of this variation do not necessarily comply with corresponding spatial patterning of main types of historical family systems, making a space for further fruitful explorations of family historians.
That the predictive relationship of the Patriarchy Index with measures of the contemporary gender inequality has been confirmed supports the findings of an increasing number of studies pointing out the impact of historical conditions, structures and institutions on contemporary disparities in development, well-being, and wealth (e.g. Nunn, 2009) . It also reiterates the importance of family and household as historically crucial sites for generating societal inequalities (Alesina et al., 2013; Todd, 1985) . The patterning of the many elements of power relations and agency contained in the Index, and their spatial contours, alert us that the major variations in the "intensity" of gender and generational biases may be critical to the analysis of historic cross-country differentials in fertility, social mobility, human capital formation, and parental control (Szołtysek et al., 2016b) . Future, contextually anchored studies should be able to assess whether what is at stake here are not only stronger or weaker variants of one patriarchal system, but rather significantly different patriarchal systems in the European past, particularly as they have interacted with various family, demographic, and socioeconomic systems. Boy as last child the proportion of boys among the last children (if the last child is one of a set of siblings of both sexes, he or she will be excluded from the analysis).
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